100-year history of US meddling, coups and wars in the Middle East
Unpacking the layers of betrayal, war, and geopolitical maneuvering that have left a profound mark
21WIRE
In this video, Professor Roy Casagranda, an expert in history and political science, offers a comprehensive analysis of the past century of Middle Eastern history.
Through a deep dive into the complexities of US intervention, he examines key events and policies that have shaped the region and explores significant topics such as the Sykes-Picot agreement, CIA-engineered coups in Syria and Iran, and the aftermath of colonialism, revealing the damaging and often cynical impact of US actions on the Arab world.
Hosted by Ashfaaq Carim, journalist at Middle East Eye, this lecture takes us through a 100-year journey, unpacking the layers of betrayal, war, and geopolitical maneuvering that have left a profound mark on the Middle East.
Summary of Interview
The rationale of the Eisenhower doctrine
Professor Roy Casagranda begins by explaining that the common assumption about the Eisenhower doctrine is that a Middle Eastern country could request American economic assistance or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression. Casagranda begins by explaining that the doctrine was not primarily about fighting communism or protecting the Middle East but that instead, its primary goals were to destroy the French & British Empires, prevent Pan-Arabism from succeeding & to stop Arabs from unifying into a single state –priorities Eisenhower saw as more important than fighting communism. Looking at history, the U.S. began to assert itself as a global power after the Spanish-American War and played an important role in the conclusion of World War I. By the time of World War II, Europe was in ruins, and the U.S. recognized that the next global struggle would be between itself and the Soviet Union. While President Truman wanted to isolate and contain the Soviet threat, President Eisenhower sought to replace the British and French empires and elevate the U.S. as the new superpower. During the Eisenhower administration, U.S. military presence in the Middle East was already well established, influenced by deep historical anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe. Casagranda explains that by the 1760 census, Islam had become the third-largest religion in America, and there was a long history of attempts to “de-Muslimize” enslaved populations by converting them to Christianity. This long-standing anti-Muslim sentiment contributed to the geopolitical actions of the time.
The Middle East, historically home to multiple superpowers, had a complex relationship with outside powers. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, many in Europe and America held the belief that the region could not be allowed to house another superpower. Eisenhower feared the Pan-Arab movement, worried that its success could create a Middle Eastern superpower. An example of this geopolitical strategy played out during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser purchased World War II military equipment from Czechoslovakia, a communist state, it led Britain to cut off funding for the Aswan High Dam. In response, Nasser went to the U.S. to ask for funding, but the U.S. refused. Nasser then nationalized the Suez Canal to raise funds for the dam. This move prompted Israel to attack Egypt, dropping paratroopers into Sinai, hoping that Egypt’s military would be lured across the Suez Canal to defend the Sinai Peninsula. However, Nasser did not fall for the bait, and the French and British then seized territory. Eisenhower intervened on Egypt’s behalf, siding with Nasser and taking action at the United Nations to shame and humiliate the British and French. Casagranda points out that if Eisenhower’s true concern was the spread of communism, he would not have sided with Egypt, a country with communist ties. The fact that the U.S. took Egypt’s side in this dispute highlights the doctrine’s focus on preventing Arab unity, rather than fighting communism.
In 1958, Egypt and Syria unified to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), while Sudan gained independence from Egypt. Meanwhile, Iraq was in the midst of a revolution, overthrowing its monarchy and planning to join the UAR and expressed its desire to annex Kuwait. All of a sudden, the U.S. sends in the Marine Corps to invade Lebanon. If the Eisenhower doctrine was we’re gonna defend you from invasion, who got invaded? – there was no direct threat to Lebanon, no civil war, and neither Syria nor Iraq had been invaded. Casagranda argues that this was a show of force by Eisenhower, who threatened to use nuclear weapons against Iraq if it invaded Kuwait. During the Iraqi Revolution, Casangranda mentions, Eisenhower backed the communist forces believing that the communists would prevent Iraq from joining the UAR and the U.S. government feared the unification of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq into a single state, as it would have created a powerful Middle Eastern superpower. Three years later, the UAR collapsed when Syria declared its independence. In 1958, Eisenhower shows that his primary goal was to prevent the creation of the UAR, even if it meant aligning with communist factions. This, according to Casagranda, reveals that the Eisenhower Doctrine’s priorities were based on geopolitical considerations—mainly the prevention of Arab unity—rather than a fight against communism.
Who are Arabs and what is the Arab world?
Casagranda starts by explaining how Arabs are defined largely by their shared language and culture, which stemmed from the 7th century expansion of Islam. After the death of Prophet Muhammad, Arab armies left the Arabian Peninsula, initiating a series of military campaigns that would lead to the defeat of the Persian Empire and the conquest of a huge chunk of the Roman Empire in Palestine and Syria. Over time, these conquests extended from Morocco to Iraq, and even included parts of Iran, Somalia, Eritrea, and Mauritania. These regions, while culturally and linguistically diverse, all became Arabic-speaking as a result of this expansion. Casagranda further highlights that despite the Arab world being culturally and linguistically diverse, the Arab identity remains powerful, even if it is sometimes hard to define by modern political borders. For example, Moroccans still consider themselves Arabic despite significant cultural differences. The key identity marker for Arabs is still their shared language, and it remains central to their identity, regardless of the nation they live in.
In the context of Pan-Arabism, Casagranda points to an Egyptian uprising in 1990 by Christian Egyptians who sought to create a single Pan-Arab state, stretching from Mauritania to Iraq. This state would be secular, socialist, and promote the national identity of Arabs across the region, a vision rooted in the desire for Arab unity and solidarity. This idea of Pan-Arabism emerged as a response to the division caused by colonial borders. These borders, Casagranda asserts, were designed with the goal of dividing and conquering Arab peoples, preventing them from uniting and preventing the rise of a single Arab superpower. They were largely the result of European powers drawing artificial lines in an attempt to break up a region that shared many cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties. These divisions would ensure that the region remained divided and fragmented under the control of European powers.
The shockingly non-Muslim nature of the early Arab Empire
A particularly interesting aspect of the early Arab Empire was its surprising non-Muslim nature. Casagranda points out that when the Muslim Arabs expanded their empire into Spain and Portugal, they conquered an area that stretched from Spain to the border of Pakistan and India—the largest empire of its time. However, the Arabs did not impose their religion or language on the conquered peoples. In fact, local rulers were often left in place, with the Arab Empire taking control of major political decisions. The Arabic language became the dominant language in many regions, including Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, but this was not a result of violent conquest. Instead, it was largely a consequence of trade and economics: speaking Arabic became financially advantageous for conducting business across the empire.
Sykes-Picot, oil and the WW1 map
CIA coup in Syria in 1949
Syria gained its independence from the French Empire in 1946. The first president of Syria, following the establishment of the Syrian Republic, oversaw what were initially free and fair elections. However, in the midst of this transition, a CIA-backed coup d’etat toppled the government, resulting in catastrophic consequences for Syria. The country became embroiled in a series of coups, with 11 different governments in the span of just 9 years. This period of instability severely hampered Syria’s development, leaving it in chaos.
In 1958, Shukri al-Quwatli, who had previously held power, recognized that Syria had become a failed state. He sought to address the situation by approaching Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, with a proposal to unify Syria with Egypt. However, Nasser was hesitant, believing that Egypt lacked the necessary infrastructure, political systems, and institutions to undertake this union. Undeterred, al-Quwatli offered Nasser two choices: either Egypt would annex Syria to form a United Arab Republic, or Syria would fall into the hands of the communists, who were on the verge of taking control. Nasser, a staunch anti-communist, chose to annex Syria in order to prevent a communist takeover.
The union, however, did not last. The Syrian military soon staged a coup, withdrawing Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961. The country would go on to experience further turmoil until 1970, when Hafez al-Assad took power. Assad’s regime helped stabilize Syria, and he ruled the country until his death. His son, Bashar al-Assad, has ruled ever since. According to Roy Casagranda, the US’s involvement in the Syrian coup was more of an experiment to see if the CIA could successfully execute a coup in a non-oil-rich state with no major economic or ideological implications. Syria under al-Quwatli was not a threat to US foreign policy, and its economy and political landscape posed no challenge to American interests. He argues that the US intervention in Syria was not driven by any strategic objective and concludes that the CIA-backed coup was a grand failure for the United States, destabilizing the country without any clear or meaningful gain.
CIA coup in Iran in 1953
In 1905, Iran began experimenting with the idea of becoming an electoral republic, implementing democratic institutions and holding elections. The British were horrified by this development, fearing that if Iran became a democratic society, the Iranian people would vote to end the huge 86% British oil concession. Concerned about losing control of Iran’s oil, the British turned to Russia to help overthrow Iran’s government and restore the monarchy.
In 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran. He sought to end the huge oil concession that the British had secured when they established the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which later became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh made the decision to nationalize Iran’s oil and give the British a 0% concession. Aware that the British would likely try to overthrow his government, he took drastic steps to prevent this. Mossadegh expelled the British embassy and severed diplomatic relations with Britain to limit their influence and prevent any coup attempts. In response, the British approached President Truman and asked for CIA support to help stage a coup and remove Mossadegh. Truman, however, objected to this idea. Once Eisenhower became president, the U.S. fully supported the coup, and Mossadegh was overthrown. After the coup, the British believed things would return to the status quo, but Eisenhower informed them that the U.S. would now replace Britain as the dominant power in Iran. This marked the beginning of the US-Iran relationship, a partnership that would later end in catastrophe with the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
How intertwined did Iran become with the USA with the Shah?
The Shah was a big dreamer. During World War II, the British overthrew his father, Reza Shah, to ensure that nothing would happen in Iran that could disrupt their oil supplies. With Reza Shah removed, his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, became the new Shah of Iran. However, his power was not as strong as the British had hoped, which is why in 1950, Iran briefly became a Republic under Mohammad Mossadegh, who became Prime Minister. When the US staged the coup against Mossadegh, they did not replace him with their own Prime Minister but instead restored the Shah to the throne, transforming Iran into a constitutional monarchy.
The relationship between the Shah and the US became strong because the Shah viewed the US as the model he wanted for Iran. He sought to modernize Iran, but his efforts clashed with the cultural identity of many Iranians. While he promoted the ancient culture of Iran, his focus on modernization and Westernization alienated the public. Many Iranians felt disconnected from their own culture, and the country became known as “the shopping mall of the Middle East,” a nickname that was deeply unpopular. The Shah’s push to modernize Iran quickly, without fully considering the cultural impact, led to a backlash. This rapid Westernization alienated many people and contributed to the growing tensions that eventually sparked the Islamic Revolution. The revolution was a reactionary and catastrophic event that overthrew the Shah’s regime.
The 1979 Iranian revolution
Casagrande explains how the Shah was becoming increasingly unpopular in Iran due to the backlash against the Americanization of the country. His authoritarian rule meant that dissenters faced imprisonment, exile, torture, or, in the worst cases, death. As Iranians saw their culture being eroded by rapid Westernization, the Iranian Revolution began to take shape. It was formed by two main factions: communists and Muslim fundamentalists. The US, assessing the situation, made a cold calculation: if the communists won, Iran would fall into the Soviet sphere, potentially gaining access to vital resources, such as the Arabian Gulf, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and possibly oil. The US saw this as a disastrous outcome and, as a result, backed the Islamists to prevent a communist takeover.
The Iranian Revolution took place, with the fundamentalists emerging victorious. They proceeded to murder many of the communists, and countless others fled the country. Instead of creating a Republic with diverse political competition, the new regime established a system where only those approved by the Islamic Republic could run for office. This was not the Republic that many average Iranians had hoped for, Casagranda claims. Rather than a moderating force aiming to overthrow the monarchy and bring Iran into the future, the revolution represented a reactionary force that pushed the country back into the past. While Iran was undoubtedly a modern state, the new regime pretended to reach for a glorious past—a core doctrine of many right-wing movements. Casagranda explains how whenever right-wing movements seek to recreate an imagined past, they are, in fact, projecting their vision for the future, even though that vision is a modern one. Historical examples of this include the Nazis, who sought to recreate 1000 A.D., and the fascists in Italy under Mussolini, who aimed to restore the Roman Empire. These right-wing movements manifest in different ways, but their fundamental goal is always to craft a future based on an idealized past.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
When the revolution happened in Iran, a group of students in Tehran stormed the US embassy in November 1979 because they wanted the documents that proved the CIA had overthrown the Mossadegh government. This incident became an international crisis and was a disaster for the Islamic Republic, which then began negotiating with the students to release the hostages. The students captured over 50 hostages, most of whom were CIA operatives responsible for shredding documents that contained proof of US interference in other countries. Tehran served as the headquarters for all CIA operations in Asia and the CIA operatives, knowing they would be captured and having been warned by the Iranian government in advance, chose to remain at the embassy to finish shredding the documents.
The students captured the embassy, took the shredded documents, stuffed them into garbage bags, and went to nearby schools where they dumped the documents and asked the kids to reassemble them. The children managed to put the documents back together, which provided undeniable proof that the US had not only overthrown the Iranian government in 1953 but also how CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt had done it. In the students’ view, the United States had to come clean about its involvement and apologize. They refused to release the CIA operatives until this demand was met. Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a top cleric in the revolution, began negotiating with the students. However, just as it appeared he had reached a deal with them, members of the Reagan campaign arrived in Iran, offering suitcases full of money to ensure that the hostages were not released before the US elections. They feared that if the students were freed before the election, Carter would win the presidency. Naively, Carter was unaware of this interference and worked until noon on the day Reagan was inaugurated to secure the hostages’ release—just as Reagan took office, the hostages were finally released.
With Reagan now President, he told Saddam Hussein in Iraq that the US wanted to strike at the Islamic Republic of Iran for revenge and persuaded Saddam to attack Iran. The US argued that the South-West corner of Iran, which was primarily Arab-speaking, should be annexed by Iraq. Saddam Hussein, relying on faulty US intelligence, agreed to the invasion. The US claimed that the Iranian military had been decimated by the death of many of its generals and colonels, expecting Iran’s forces to collapse. However, this did not happen. Instead, the conflict escalated into a catastrophic 8-year war, resulting in the deaths of at least one million people—three-quarters of a million Iranians and one-quarter of a million Iraqis. The war achieved nothing other than widespread death and economic devastation for both nations.
The 1991 Gulf War and sanctions
In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, in 1989, both countries went to the OPEC states for assistance in recovering from the devastation of the war. Saudi Arabia, at the center of the OPEC discussions, proposed that every OPEC member would cut their oil production, allowing Iran and Iraq to increase their production by the same amount. This would maintain the overall supply of oil in the marketplace, stabilizing the price, while giving Iran and Iraq a larger share of the market, enabling them to use the extra revenue to repair and rebuild their economies. However, Kuwait began flooding the oil market with additional oil, causing the price of oil to plummet. Any advantage Iran and Iraq had gained from their increased production was quickly wiped out. Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of intentionally undermining Iraq’s position and initiated an investigation through the UN. The UN team discovered that Kuwait was overproducing and stealing Iraqi oil by drilling excessively at the border, tapping into fields on the Iraqi side.
Saddam then summoned the US Ambassador to Iraq, telling her that Iraq intended to attack Kuwait, citing Iraq’s historical claims to the territory. The US Ambassador replied, “What happens in Arab states is of no concern to the United States.” Saddam Hussein took this as a green light and proceeded with the invasion. Initially, George Bush Sr. seemed unconcerned, but after a meeting in Aspen with Margaret Thatcher, he drastically changed his position. He suddenly declared Saddam Hussein a “Hitler,” and this shift led to the initiation of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Kuwait could have been liberated from Iraq without the level of destruction that followed, but the US chose a much more extreme approach. The bombing campaign launched by the US lasted for a month and has no reasonable explanation other than the US testing new weapons systems and inflicting mass casualties. This shocking level of destruction drew global condemnation. Casagranda argues that this scale of devastation was excessive, with the true motive being less about liberating Kuwait and more about showcasing military power.
The 2003 Iraq War
The second war is even worse. In the aftermath of the first war, George Bush Sr. announces that as soon as Iraq gets rid of its weapons of mass destruction, it will be reintegrated into the international community. Iraq, however, misunderstands this statement and proceeds to take their chemical weapons out into the desert and destroy them. They do this in August 1991, thinking they have complied with Bush’s directive. Casagranda here insists that the chemical weapons Iraq had were misclassified and are not considered weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but are instead classified as “terror weapons.” The number of people killed by chemical weapons is shockingly low, but the deaths are horrific. WMDs, according to Casagranda, refer to nuclear or biological weapons, not chemical ones.When the UN inspection team arrives and asks for the chemical weapons, Iraq insists they no longer have any. The UN team presses them, and Iraq claims they destroyed the weapons. By 1998, Scott Ritter, a US Marine leading the inspection team, confirms that he found 98% of the serial numbers from the destroyed weapons in the debris. The lifespan of the rest of the weapons had expired, meaning Iraq posed no threat.
However, Casagranda explains, as Bill Clinton was embroiled in the Monica Lewinsky scandal, he needed a way to strike back at the public and thus ordered the UN weapons inspection team to bomb Iraq, which they did. Saddam Hussein, accusing the US of playing dirty, refused to allow the inspection team back in. In 2002, George Bush Jr. threatens war, and to prevent this, Saddam Hussein allows the weapons inspection team back in. However, Iraq is bombed once again, and the US goes to war with Iraq over weapons they knew Iraq didn’t have.
Casagranda argues that the reason George Bush Jr. initiated the second war may be explained by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a think tank founded in 1997 by prominent neoconservative figures in the US. In 1998, they sent a series of letters to Bill Clinton advocating for an invasion of Iraq, to be followed by the conquest of Syria and Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The goal was to create an imperial foothold in the Middle East, securing Israel and dividing the region further. The US military created the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), making the Middle East the center of US military operations. This plan, however, turned into a complete disaster. The Iraqi people “Vietnamed” the US, leading to a humiliating withdrawal and a catastrophic loss of life.
The genesis of the Saudi-US relationship
The Saudi royal family created the first Saudi state in the 1700s, which lasted around 80 years. However, in 1818, the Ottoman Empire destroyed this Saudi state, as it had expanded into territories that the Ottomans considered theirs, including parts of the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. A second and third Saudi state emerged shortly after, with the goal of building an even larger Saudi state. During this period, the Sauds began collaborating with the British.
By the 1950s, Saudi Arabia had entered a long-term relationship with the United States, a partnership initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1945 deal with the Saudi King. In the 1930s, American oil companies, particularly Caltex (a Texas oil company), discovered substantial oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. The discovery led to a significant partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia. During World War II, as the Germans launched the Battle of the Bulge in a desperate attempt to turn the tide of the war, the US and British forces found themselves at risk. The Germans had moved all their best tanks and troops to the Western Front, aiming to break through Belgium and reach the English Channel to cut off the allied forces. The Germans believed that by defeating the US and UK, they could pressure them into negotiating a peace settlement to focus on the Soviet Union. However, they ran out of gasoline on their way to the English Channel, leading to a decisive allied victory.
Following this, Roosevelt recognized that the US could never afford to run out of gasoline during critical moments of war. To ensure the US was never in that vulnerable position, Roosevelt traveled to Egypt in January 1945 to meet with the Saudi King. They struck a deal to form Aramco, one of the world’s largest oil companies. As part of the agreement, Saudi Arabia agreed to trade oil exclusively in US dollars, and the US established a military base in Dhahran. In exchange, Saudi Arabia promised never to cut off oil supplies to the US, and the US agreed to protect the Saudi royal family indefinitely. According to Casagranda, Saudi Arabia was fortunate in this arrangement, as it effectively created a mutually beneficial, co-dependent relationship with the United States. This agreement ensured that the US had a strong economic and strategic interest in maintaining a stable relationship with Saudi Arabia, making it unlikely that the US would disrupt the flow of oil from the Kingdom.
A history of Egypt and Nasser’s Pan-Arab vision
In 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt, and after securing the region, he moved on to invade Palestine. His objective was to relocate the Jewish population from France to Palestine and to ethnically cleanse the Jewish population out of Europe. Napoleon was ultimately defeated, and the French forces were forced to retreat from Egypt. Napoleon decided to return to France and focus on conquering Europe. Meanwhile, an Albanian general, inspired by Napoleon, took his Ottoman army, invaded and conquered Crete, then moved on to Egypt and Palestine, advancing through Syria and into Turkey. The Ottoman Empire eventually stopped him, and he negotiated a deal, returning Syria and Turkey in exchange for becoming the governor of an autonomous Egypt. This led to the formation of a dynasty of kings in Egypt, who governed the semi-autonomous state.
The French, who had built the Suez Canal on Egyptian labor, underpaid the workers and then charged Egypt for the canal. In order to pay off the debt, Egypt borrowed money from European banks. In 1882, the British Empire used Egypt’s debt as an excuse to invade and take control of the country, turning Egypt into a protectorate within the British Empire. This marked Egypt’s formal independence from the Ottoman Empire. Casagranda explains that Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s goal was to create a United Arab Republic. After a revolution in 1880, British forces attacked Egypt in 1882, capitalizing on the country’s instability. Egypt underwent another revolution in 1919, and in 1952, a third revolution occurred. The army took control and overthrew the monarchy, marking the end of the revolution. Mohamed Naguib became the first President of Egypt, but he was compromised by the CIA, who bribed him with bags of money. Nasser learned of this and staged a coup to take over the country, having been preparing for this moment. He established a new constitution and held a vote, moving towards a Pan-Arab state. Nasser aimed to create a skilled, technocratic population in Egypt to transform the country into a fully modern state.
However, the situation in Syria began to derail Nasser’s plans, as Syria was a collapsed state. Meanwhile, Yemen descended into a civil war, with monarchists and socialists fighting for control. The socialists called on Egypt for assistance, and in 1961, Yemen became a republic. Nasser’s vision of a “United Arab States” took form, with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen joining, and Iraq planning to follow. These countries, including Sudan and Palestine, would have variants of the United Arab States flag, symbolizing their unification. However, the Egyptian army was bogged down in Yemen, and Nasser’s dream of a united Arab world began to collapse. At the same time, a new force emerged—Islamic fundamentalism. In a speech, Nasser recalled a meeting he had with the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood early in his presidency, where the Brotherhood leader expressed the desire for women to cover their hair. Nasser rejected this, arguing that people should be free to choose their actions. His speech, delivered to a live audience, was met with laughter, as the idea seemed laughable at the time. However, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, along with the corruption of his government and the challenges in Yemen, led to further instability. By 1967, Syria and Sudan broke away from the Arab union, and Nasser’s vision was in tatters.
The 1967 war
Around this time, the Israelis begin raiding Jordan, and the King of Jordan reaches out to Nasser for help. Feeling backed into a corner, Nasser decides to declare the Strait of Tiran closed. The Strait of Tiran is a narrow waterway between the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt) and the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia), and it is crucial for Israeli access to the Red Sea and its port of Eilat. However, the gesture is purely symbolic, as Nasser does not enforce it. Nevertheless, Israel declares war, and Nasser sends a communiqué to US President Lyndon B. Johnson, expressing his desire to resolve the situation peacefully without the Israelis officially attacking Egypt. President Johnson assures Nasser that Israel won’t attack, but the Israelis do attack, completely surprising the Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian militaries. In a swift six-day Blitzkrieg war in 1967, Israel defeats all three countries. At this point, Nasser loses all legitimacy, Egypt loses the Sinai, and the Suez Canal is shut down by the Israelis, cutting off European and Asian trade. Israel seizes the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.The Palestinian population is now under total Israeli control, marking a shocking and game-changing event. Nasser walks into Maidan Tahrir Square in Cairo, declaring he is ready to resign, but the Egyptians lift him up and proclaim that he is Egypt’s President. He remains President until his death three years later. What happened was that Nasser went up against the United States and ultimately wasn’t able to pull it off, Casagranda explains, stating that this war is worth examining as many lessons can be learned from it.
Was the US privy to Israel’s attack?
The US had a ship off the coast of the Sinai, the USS Liberty, which was attacked and sunk by the Israelis. When the US sailors were trying to escape the ship and get onto lifeboats, Israeli aircraft came in and shot at the sailors in the water. At one point, an Israeli boat even grabbed a lifeboat, lifted it into the air, and threw the sailors into the water. Casagranda claims this event was bizarre and suggests there was a disagreement between Israel and the US about whether they should attack or not. However, he also considers the possibility that US President Lyndon B. Johnson knew this would happen and gave Israel the green light to attack. Casagranda notes that there isn’t enough evidence to definitively say the US was involved, but he believes it’s likely that the US was in on it, as the entire incident remains shrouded in mystery.
Israel’s creation and Zionism
In the aftermath of WWII, the Zionist movement gained significant legitimacy. Zionism had its roots in the late 19th century, particularly after the Dreyfus Affair in 1894. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish-German officer in the French artillery, was accused by France of espionage and passing military secrets to Germany. The Jewish population in Germany saw this as an attack on Jews. Casagranda claims however, that it’s equally possible that it was an attack on an ethnic German in France, implying a component of anti-German sentiment as well. The evidence against Dreyfus was weak and based on forged documents, but he was still convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island, a French penal colony off the coast of South America. The Zionist movement emerged, with Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) being its primary figure. While the idea of Zionism existed earlier, notably Napoleon had considered sending Jews to Palestine, Herzl’s movement solidified it. Prior to this, the dominant Jewish ideology in Germany was “Judenhass,” or “Jew-hatred.” This was later redefined as “anti-Semitism,” which became a more rational-sounding term. The Zionists interpreted this growing animosity and decided that, perhaps, leaving Europe for Palestine might be the solution. Herzl initially considered Uganda as a potential destination for Jews, not Palestine.
What followed was the creation of a European-Jewish population eager to undertake a colonial enterprise similar to what happened in Argentina, the US, Canada, and Australia—where white settlers displaced and genocided native peoples. Ultimately, the Zionists focused on Palestine, with the British Balfour Declaration reinforcing the idea of creating a Jewish homeland there. Before WWII, many Jews began migrating to Palestine, where they were welcomed by the local Palestinians, who hoped for peaceful coexistence, based on a historical record of Muslims, Jews, and Christians living side by side. The Palestinian population had, in the past, embraced Jews as allies, particularly during the Crusades, when Jews, along with Christians, rejected the Crusaders and aligned with Muslims. During the 1910s-1930s, as Jewish migration to Palestine increased, many Palestinian families welcomed Jewish refugees only to be kicked out of their own homes. European Jewish immigrants formed terrorist organizations and attacked British hotels, military bases etc. They also attempted to legally purchase 5-10% of the land and later proceed to confiscate the land completely by taking the pieces of land that nobody owned and begin to colonize Palestine. WWII happens and the international community becomes open to creating a Jewish state. Ironically, Palestinians, who had no involvement in the Holocaust, ended up paying the price for it. During the war, some Jewish Palestinians fought in a Jewish brigade, but Palestinian Muslims were not allowed to join, as the Zionists feared Palestinians gaining combat experience.
After WWII, the UN voted to divide Palestine into two states—one for the Jews and one for the Palestinians. The division granted Israel 55% of Palestine, with the remaining 45% allocated to a state that would be home to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, an unfair deal. Since the vast majority of land designated for Israel had not been purchased by the Jewish population, but was instead gifted to the Zionists, Palestinians rejected the plan, leading to the 1948 war. The Egyptian army, poorly equipped, along with forces from Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, tried to prevent the Zionists from establishing their state. But Israel, better armed and with more combat experience, prevailed and Israel ended up controlling 78% of Palestine by the end of the war. The UN division of Palestine created three Israeli enclaves: one in the center, one in the northeast, and one in the south. Palestinians were left with several disconnected areas, including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Bethlehem was intended to be part of the West Bank, and Haifa was to be a Palestinian city, but Israel took control of all of them. The Israelis also took East Jerusalem, which had been intended as an international zone, and made it part of Israel. During the colonization, Israeli forces carried out massacres, most notably the Deir Yassin massacre, where Jewish paramilitary groups killed hundreds of Palestinians, intending to cause panic and force Palestinians to flee. Instead of offering justice, the world witnessed more suffering for a population that had no involvement in the Holocaust.
Is Israel using the US playbook on war?
Israel operates a settler-colonial project, Casagranda explains, which is distinct from the settler-colonial history of the United States, but still involves the displacement of an indigenous population, in this case the Palestinians. The goal is to transfer land to Israeli settlers by displacing Palestinians on a grand scale. In both cases, the result is genocide. He highlights the example of the US invasion of Iraq, where between 1.3 – 2 million Iraqis were killed, and now, 45,000 Palestinians have died in Gaza, a staggering proportion of the population and states that these events should all be classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity. What is especially troubling to Casagranda is the apparent lack of outrage or response from Europe and the US, which are shockingly silent while genocide unfolds. The situation is compounded by the fact that many Arab states are in ruins—eight out of 24 members of the League of Arab States are either devastated or in the midst of destruction as a direct or indirect result of western interferece (Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya). This has led to the worst refugee crisis in human history. Casagranda mentions how the global response to the mass killing of Arabs is disturbingly apathetic. He believes the root of this indifference lies in a lack of empathy and the prevalence of nationalism and trauma, which prevents people from recognizing that murdering children is never okay or that blowing up entire cities is never the answer.
The Abraham Accords
Casagranda explains the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and several Arab states. The hope with these Accords was that through dialogue, a solution could be found for the Palestinian issue and that Israel could eventually integrate into the Middle East. While there was a possibility of normalization, he now believes that after over a year of genocide in Gaza, Israel has painted itself into such a corner that finding a peaceful resolution will be extremely difficult. His fear is that instead of cooler heads prevailing, the conflict could fester, and global powers like the US, China, or Russia may exploit the situation to keep the Arab world in a state of chaos and division.
Israel’s fate
Casagranda concludes by reflecting on a speech by historian Ilan Pappé at the Berlin Peace Institute. Pappé, who calls Israel’s actions a settler-colonial project, says something crucial: “There’s no doubt Israel is on the wrong side of this, but my children are Israeli.” Casagranda states that even when people are on the wrong side, they are still human beings, and any solution must address the needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. He emphasizes the importance of finding a way to stop the violence and engage in conversations that could lead to peace. While the Abraham Accords sought to normalize relations, Casagranda hopes that the next Israeli president will initiate secret negotiations that result in Israel’s surrender, followed by a truth and reconciliation process akin to South Africa’s. He believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable and advocates for a single-state solution, where everyone, both Israelis and Palestinians, can live peacefully in a shared, secular state and envisions a future where Israelis overcome trauma and begin serious negotiations for surrender, ultimately creating a just, peaceful outcome.
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Prof. Roy Casagranda is a Professor of Government at Austin Community College in Texas, and is the institution’s Middle East affairs expert, where he gives monthly public lectures on the intersection of politics, history, economics, psychology, and philosophy. He is also the author of the book, “The Blood Throne of Caria (Empire of the Nightingale)“.
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